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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
DALE \V. CORBRIDGE and 
DARLENE CORBRIDGE, 
Paintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
M. MORRIN AND SON, INC., 
a corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF CASE 
Case No. 
10853 
This is an action to recover damages for per-
sonal injuries sustained by the plaintiff when she 
fell into a construction excavation. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial court granted defendant's motion for 
summary judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
That judgment of the trial court be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent agrees generally with appellant's 
statement of facts except as hereinafter qualified 
or amplified. 
1 
The detour signs installed by the def end a t, 
h h n °' t e sout end of the detoured area were approxi~ 
mately 100 yards south of the excavation rathei 
than two or three hundred yards as indicated br 
appellants. The detour signs consisted of a sign wi ~ 
hash marks, a "Road Closed" sign, and a ''Detou~ .. : 
sign. See the copies of photographs attached to dE-
fendant's memorandum (R. 14). Also south of tht 
detour signs were two signs marked "Keep Leff' 
and "Slow". All signs had flashing yellow lighb 
mounted on them. (Dep. p. 16). 
At the time plaintiff stopped her automobile 
she did observe the detour signs ( Dep. p. 12) and 
she knew she was in the detoured construction area 
(Dep. p. 7-8). She was familiar with the area tu 
the extent that she knew this area of the highway 
had been detoured for construction purposes and 
that there was a two-lane detour road around the 
construction area which she had driven over earlier 
that day on her way to Lagoon ( Dep. p. 7). The 
detour road was marked with lights to show its 
course (Dep. p. 16). 
The headlights of plaintiff's automobile were 
working properly when she stopped it inside the 
construction area facing in a northerly direction, 
but she turned the headlights off before she started 
walking to the north through the construction area 
( Dep. p. 10). She had no estimate of the distan~e 
she walked after leaving her automobile because it 
was too dark. She could see nothing in the direction 
2 
she ·was walking except the taillights of the auto-
mobile on the other side of the consfruction area 
( Dep. p. 11). She could not see the ground or where 
she was putting her feet ( Dep. p. 12-13). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF'S CONDUCT WAS NEGLIGENT 
AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
\Vith i·espect to the law regarding summary 
judgment cited by plaintiffs, we have no quarrel. 
The citations ai·e general statements recognized by 
all courts i·egarding this doctrine. However, they 
are not helpful with respect to the specific issue, i.e., 
v;as the plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence 
in walking into a construction area of unknown 
characte1· in darkness which was so complete that 
she vvas unable to see where she put her feet or any 
of the large objects in the area where she walked. 
Her conduct was tantamount to walking off into an 
unknown area blindfolded. The complete lack of vis-
ibility is documented in several places in the trans-
cript of plaintiff's deposition. The following testi-





Do you have any estimate of how far 
you walked from your car to where this 
accident happened, where you fell? 
No sir· I couldn't because it was dark 















Could you see anything at all as 
walked along there? Yut 
Not in the direction I was going ex , 
for her red lights. ce:n 
Di~ you see any lu~1ber or building n" 
tenal or anythmg hke that? ln-
No, sir. 
Did you see any at the time you wei·t 
there? 
No, I didn't. 
PAGE 12. 
\Vas it so dark you couldn't see where 
you \Yere putting your feet? 
Yes. In fact, when I was down in the 
hole it was so dark I couldn't even see 
my hand in front of my face. When I 
looked up I couldn't see the top of the 
hole. It was real dark and the wind waf 
blowing quite a bit out there. 
* * * 
You didn't see any lumber stacked or any 
lumber forms or any debris at all? 
Not in front of me; no, sir. 
You just started walking in the dark? 
( N odcling her head up and down.) 
You couldn't see the ground and all of a 
sudden your feet went out from under 
you, is that right? 
A. Yes, sir." 
Regarding the negligence of persons venturing 
into construction areas where they are not author-
4 
izerl to be, the case of Wold vs. Ogden City, 123 Utah 
~70, ~58 P.2d 453,decided by the Utah Supreme 
Court in 1953 is very much in point. In that case, 
:he plain tiff admitted the following facts in his open-
ing statement to the jury. Ogden City, through its 
contractor, had dug a trench along 18th Street in 
front of plaintiff's residence and had not provided 
any way for plaintiff to cross the trench in front 
.1f his home. At about 2 :30 a.m. on the day of the 
accident, plaintiff and his wife were returning home 
after Yisiting. It was extremely dark, there being 
iw street lights in the irnmediatee vicinity. Rather 
than walking one-half block around the construction 
area, plaintiff attempted to cross the trench and 
was injured when he fell into it. The trial court 
granted defendant's motion for non-suit at the con-
clusion of plaintiff's opening statement. 
This Court affirmed the trial court's action in 
stating: 
''Under such facts we believe plaintiff 
was contributorily negligent and also assum-
ed a known risk precluding recovery as a mat-
ter of law, denying no constitutional right to 
a jury trial. 
* * * 
"Plaintiff's conduct, aside from concept 
of assumption of risk, was unreasonable in 
the light of this known hazard and the exis-
tence of a convenient, hardly burdensome de-
tour at the intersection of Grant and 18th 
Street, where the trench ended, and through 
which plaintiff had driven shortly before his 
5 
injury. To deliberately attempt to cross u d 
such circumstances seems to be that t ~: r·:· 
lack of due care not attrib~t~ble to the ~\·di~'.~ 
ary prudent person exerc1smg care fol' h;, 
own safety." " 
The instant case is very similar. Althou I' 
plaintiff may not have known the exact nature ~f 
the hazard contained in the construction area, shl 
was put on notice that there was danger of some 
kind there because of the fact that the highway had 
been detoured and an alternate temporary road hacl 
been provided over which the plaintiff had traveled 
earlier that day. 
A quite similar case factually is the Kentucky 
case of Barrick11ian vs. Louisville, 167 S.W. 151 
I 
where a pedestrian plaintiff was injured by walking 
into a pile of planks about one foot high stacked on 
a drive-way leading into the street. A warning light 
had been sitting on the pile of planks earlier in thE 
day but was not burning when the plaintiff collided 
with it. She had passed the area ear lier in the ew-
ning with friends by walking along one side of the 
street which was used as an unpaved sidewalk 
However, when they returned, the walk area was 
muddy and so plaintiff and her friends decided tn 
walk in the street and in walking out into the drive-
way, plaintiff struck the obstruction and was in-
jured. The trial court directed a verdict for the de-
fendant which was affirmed on appeal by the Ken· 
tucky Supreme Court which stated: 
"In this case appellant knew the street 
6 
was closed to traffic; she lived only a few 
blocks away; she had seen these obstructions 
a few short hours before with the danger sig-
nal hanging on them; and if, with the know-
ledge of ~hese facts, to escape the slippery and 
muddy sidewalk, she chose to use the drive-
way which she knew was closed for traffic, 
and was thereby injured, there can be no re-
covery." 
In the case at bar, the plaintiff admittedly 
knew of the detour, having passed over it a few 
hours before; and on her return trip she stopped 
her car just north of the detour sign at the south 
end of the construction area. For some reason best 
known to herself, the plaintiff elected to attempt 
ro walk through the construction area rather than 
along the detour road provided by the defendant. 
The following cases, although dissimilar as to 
whe1·e the reported accidents occurred, show quite 
cleal'ly that the law in Utah does not permit one to 
walk into an unlighted or unseen hazard, whether 
indoors or outdoors, and then recover damages for 
injuries sustained as a result thereof. 
In Ternpest vs. Richardson, 5 Utah 2d 174, 299 
P.2d 124, ( 1956) plaintiff, as a social guest at-
tempting to find the bathroom in defendant's home, 
mistakenly opened a door leading into the basement 
and fell down an unlighted stairway. The trial court 
granted defendant's motion for summary judgment 
and the plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court af-
firmed in the fallowing language: 
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"Had appellant exercised ordinary a 
reasonable care for her own safety, she wou1~ 
not have ope!led a door ai:d stepped into, 
dark a~d unhg~ted are.a with which she wa~ 
unaquarnted, without first ascertaining what 
was beyond the door even though she had not 
been told that the room to which she was go 
ing was lighted." · · 
In Wood vs. Wood, 8 Utah 2d 278, 333 P.2d 
630 ( 1959), the plaintiff sued to recover for injur-
ies she sustained in falling into an unrailed and un-
lighted stairwall in the garage portion of def end-
an t's home. Plaintiff had seen the stairway approx-
imately ten months prior to the accident, but tem-
porarily forgot about it at the time of the accident. 
The trial court entered judgment for defendant and 
plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed on 
the basis that the facts showed the plaintiff was 
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. 
In this regard the Court stated: 
"We have discussed the contentions as to 
defendant's primary negligence merely to in-
dicate our doubts as to its existence. But it 
is unnecessary to resolve the issue as to whe-
ther a jury question existed in that regard 
because of the view we take of contributory 
negligence. It supports the trial court's dire.c-
tion of a verdict against the plaintiff, as will 
presently appear. 
"Plaintiff says that although she had 
prior knowledge of the stairwell she could not 
be charged with negligence as a matter of Ia:v 
for walking into the open stairwell beca:iise m 
the darkness it was a hidden danger m the 
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area where she might reasonably be expected 
to enter the house because of the implied in-
vitation; and justifies her failure to be aware 
of it by the fact that her mind was preoccu-
pied by the wedding plans and that it had 
been ten months since she had seen it. In that 
regard she is confronted with a dilemma: she 
either had in mind the existence of the stair-
well 01· she did not. If she did, she was obliged 
to guanl against the known hazard; if she did 
not she is met with the principal recently af-
finnecl by this court in the case of Tempest 
vs. Riclwrdson that a guest could not enter 
heedlessly into the darkness into an unknown 
area and then complain of dangers there en-
countered.'' 
And in Henry vs. Washiki Clitb, Inc., 11 Utah 
:Zcl 1:38, 355 P.2d 973 ( 1960) the plaintiff sued to 
recover for injuries sustained when he fell down a 
darkened stai1·well while looking for a rest room in 
the back of defendant's tavern. The trial court 
granted summary judgment in favor of the defen-
dant which was affirmed by the Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Court cited the negligent conduct of 
the plaintiff in the following particulars: 
"Instead of inquiring, or observing at 
the north end of the tavern where the rest 
rooms were, he went to the south end of the 
tavern proper, through some swinging doors 
in to a room which he said was so dark he 
could hardly see at all, and groped his way 
along for about 25 feet, through another, and 
fell down a stairway." 
Also, in the case of Morris vs. Farnsworth Mo-
9 
t:z, 123 Ut~h 289, 259 P.2d 297, cited by the plain. 
tiff, the f ai.lure to use what illumination was rea. 
sonably available was held to be negligence. In th 
case the plaintiff while occupying one of defendan:~ 
motel uni ts walked from his bed toward the bath. 
room and stubbed his toe on a chair which had been , 
moved into his path of travel by defendant's em. 
ployees earlier in the day. This court held that if the 
room was sufficiently lighted so that the plaintiff 
could or should have seen the chair, then he was 
negligent in not exercising reasonable care to ob. 
serve it; on the other hand, if that portion of tht 
room was so dark that he could not see an object 
such as a chair, "due care would have required him 
to turn on a light." 
In the instant case the plaintiff testified that 
her automobile headlights were working normally 
(Dep. p. 10) when she stopped in the construction 
area after pulling around the detour signs, but 
that she turned the light off and did not turn them 
back on before she started walking in a northerly 
direction through the construction area. The auto-
mobile was facing in the same general direction 
(north) as the plaintiff's path of travel; she testi-
fied, "the detour sign would be south of my car, I 
guess, because I was facing north, going north" 
( Dep. p. 8). Yet the plaintiff failed to turn her 
automobile headlight "on" before walking off into 
the dark construction area where she was subse-
quently injured. 
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Defendant agrees that prior knowledge of a 
dangerous condition to which one exposes himself 
and is the1·eby injured does not necessarily consti-
tute negligence. However, a person who for some 
reason must subject himself to a dangerous condi-
tion must also take extra precautions to counter the 
known danger. If such precautions were those that 
a reasonably prudent person would take under the 
circumstance, such a person would not necessarily 
be negligent even though he was injured by the dan-
gerous condition. This principal is well stated in 
J.I.F.U. 15.3: 
"Inasmuch as the amount of caution used 
by the ordinary prudent person varies in di-
rect proportion to the danger known to be 
involved in this undertaking, it follows that 
in the exercise of ordinary care, the amount 
of caution required will vary in accordance 
with the nature of the act and the surround-
ing circumstances. To put the matter in an-
other way, the amount of caution required 
by the law increases, as does the danger that 
reasonably should be apprehended." 
However, in this case the plaintiff took no extra 
precautions to protect herself from the hazards of 
walking off into a known construction area in com-
plete darkness. She did not even turn on her auto-
mobile headlights. 
Likewise, the doctrine of momentary forget-
fulness urged by the plaintiff is not applicable since 
plaintiff was not injured as a result of a momen-
tary encounter with a harmful agency such as a 
11 
hi?"h voltage power line as was the situation in th 
Bickhmn vs. Southern California Edison, 263 p 2 ~ 
32, and Aiistin vs. Riverside Portland Cement Co. c 
1)1. 
pany, 282 P.2d 69, cases cited by plaintiff as auth. 
ority for this proposition. In the instant case tho 
two physical factors which contributed to plaintiff'; , 
accident were the darkness and the detoured con. 
struction area. Plaintiff could hardly contend that 
she forgot it was dark or that she forgot she was 
walking in a construction area. In fact, she deliber. 
ately chose to walk through the construction are2. 
rather than around it on the detour road provided 
for that purpose. 
POINT II. 
PLAINTIFF ASSUMED THE RISK OF IN-
JURY IN WALKING INTO THE CONSTRUC-
TION AREA IN COMPLETE DARKNESS. 
Defendant submits that under the criteria set 
forth in Clay vs. Dunford, 121 Utah 177, 239 P.2d 
1075, the plaintiff Darlene Corbridge in the instant 
case assumed the risk of being injured in leaving 
the portion of the roadway prepared for travel and 
walking into the construction area in complete dark-
ness. The Clay vs. Dunford case at page 181 sets 
forth the following requirements which must be met 
before the doctrine applies. They are: ( 1) the plain-
tiff must have looked; (2) she must have seen; (3) 
she must have known of a danger, and ( 4) she must 
have voluntarily subjected herself to the danger. 
In the instant case, there is no question but 
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that the plaintiff looked and saw the detour signs 
which routed traffice around the construction area. 
There is also no question but that she voluntarily 
chose not to use the prepared detour road but to 
walk through the construction area. Therefore, the 
real question is whether as a matter of law she 
knew of the risk involved in walking through the 
construction area in complete darkness. The plain-
tiff admitted in her deposition that she knew con-
struction was going on in the area but "figured 
they were working on the road and this is all that 
impressed me." ( Dep. p. 7). It is assumed that she 
did not know the exact nature of the construction 
vroject or of the excavation into which she fell. 
However, on the other hand, she would be charge-
able \Vith the knowledge that there were hazards 
and obstructions in the road construction area. Oth-
erwise, there would be no reason for the detour. 
The real question is then whether or not the 
dangers one may encounter in leaving a prepared 
roadway are specific enough to invoke the doctrine 
of assumption of risk. In the early case of Herdon 
vs. Salt Lake City, 34 Utah 65, 95 Pac. 646, the 
plaintiff was traveling with a team and heavy bug-
gy south on 12th East Street and desired to turn 
west on 2nd South Street. In so doing, the plaintiff 
made a wide turn and drove his team into the un-
traveled center portion of the intersection where 
one wheel of the carriage went off an embankment. 
There were no barricades blocking off the portion of 
13 
the intersection not prepared for travel. The pl ; 
"ff h a,n. ti was t rown out of the carriage and injurell · 
He stated he did not make a sharp turn becaus h" 
f "d e f was a ra1 the team would get away from him do,1~; 
the steep grade of the hill. The jury found for th 
plaintiff, but the Supreme Court reversed an~, 
granted a new trial for errors in the trial court's 
instructions. The court at page 81 indicated what 
it considered to be a proper instruction regarding 
one who departs from the traveled portion of th' 
roadway in stating: 
"We think further that the facts in this 
case are such that the court should have in-
structed the jury that it was the duty ofre. 
spondent to pursue the traveled portion of the 
street, or that part which was worked and 
prepared by the city for travel and that if he 
departed therefrom intentionally or heedless-
ly for his own convenience, or for other rea-
sons dependent upon his own volition, he as-
sume the risk in doing so. It is not the law 
that a person driving on the streets in all 
parts of the city may at will depart from the 
traveled track either by day or night, and if 
he encourters a nabiral or artificial obstruc· 
tion and suffers injury that he may recover 
damages from the city." (emphasis added). 
In the case at bar, plaintiff not only departea 
from the roadway prepared for travel, but did so in 
complete darkness. All of the elements o~ assu~p· 
tion of risk mentioned above are present m the rn· 
stant case. The plaintiff saw the detour sign (she 
had previously seen the detoured area in the day· 
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lio·ht on he1· ti·ip to Lagoon) and she voluntarily 
[;b 
walked into the construction area in darkness. The 
cases do not hold that one must anticipate the actual 
object vv-ith which they may collide or the exact man-
ner m which they may be injured or the severity 
thereof before they are guilty of assumption of risk. 
All that is required is that they realize a risk is in-
voh·ed and voluntarily subject themselves to it. The 
doctrine as defined for our use in Utah is stated in 
JIFU 17 .1, as follows: 
"One is said to assume a risk when he 
voluntarily exposes himself to that danger 
or when he knows, or in the exercise of ordin-
ary care would know, that a danger exists in 
either the conduct or condition of another, or 
in the condition, use or operation of property, 
and voluntarily places himself or remains in 
the position of danger." 
Defendant submits that the plaintiff knew, or in 
the exercise of ordinary care should know, that it 
would be dangerous to walk into a road construction 
area when it was so dark she could not see the 
ground upon which she was walking or other sub-
stantial objects in the vicinity. 
POINT III. 
PLAINTIFF \VAS NOT CONFRONTED WITH 
A SUDDEN EMERGENCY SITUATION. 
The fact that plaintiff was confronted with a 
distressing situation does ont constitute a "sudden 
emergency" in law so as to relieve her of the duty 
of exercising due care for her own safety. The 
15 
emergency doctrine is based on the need for 81 dd t" . h . t e11 
ac ion wit out time for thoughtful consideration oi · 
alternative courses. On this point, Prosser on Torts 
Second Edition, at page 137 states: " 
"Eniergency. The courts have recognized 
that an actor who is confro~ted with a sudden· 
emergency may be lef~ no time for thought, or 
may reasonably be disturbed or excited and 
so cannot weigh alternative C?~rses of action, 
but must make a speedy decision which will 
be based very largely upon impulse or in: 
stinct. He cannot be held to the same conduct 
as one who has had an opportunity to reflect' 
even though it later appears that he made th; 
wrong decision .... 
"The 'emergency' doctrine is applied onlr 
where the situation which arises is sudde~ 
and unexpected and such as to deprive the 
actor of all opportunity for deliberation .... '· 
The question in this case is not whether the 
plaintiff exercised due care in not walking on the 
detour road, but whether she exercised due care in 
walking off in to the construction area in complete 
darkness. Plaintiff takes the position that an alter· 
native choice was required between walking on the 
detour road or walking through the construction 
area. Such is not the case. Plaintiff could have asked 
the motorist who stopped to assist her to send aid 
and she could have then remained in her car until 
aid arrived; or she could have flagged down another 
motorist and asked for a ride from the beginning 
of the detour, after advising her children of her in· 
16 
tentions; 01· she could have walked south along the 
paved highway and sought aid in that direction. She 
did not act in haste or upon impulse. As stated in 
her deposition, she talked briefly with the driver of 
the car who stopped to assist her and she then walk-
ed back to her own automobile to reassure her chil-
dren before she started walking through the con-
struction area. ( Dep. p. 8-9). 
The circumstance of being confronted with a 
stalled automobile does not require one to make an 
instantaneous decision. Rather, the ordinarly pru-
dent person would be inclined, if not forced, to sit 
down and think "what do I do now". This is the 
typical situation where one must weigh various al-
ternative courses of conduct and has ample time in 
which to do so. 
POINT IV. 
PLAINTIFF'S TESTIMONY AT DEPOSITION 
IS A PROPER BASIS FOR SUMMARY JUDG-
MENT. 
Plaintiff urges that summary judgment should 
not be granted until after the trial court has heard 
all of the evidence. However, in the Wold case, 
snpm, the trial court did not hear all of the evidence 
as indicated in appellant's brief. To the contrary, 
the trial court dismissed plaintiff's case after the 
opening statement without actually hearing any of 
the evidence. In the case at bar, the trial court had 
before it the sworn testimony of the plaintiff given 
at the time of her deposition. As set forth above, her 
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testimony establishes that she was guilty of neg]i. 
gent conduct which contributed to cause the injuries · 
for which she seeks to recover. Therefore, since hei· 
right to recover is negated by her testimony already 
of record, there is no purpose in receiving furthe;, · 
testimony which cannot alter that which has alread\ ' 
been elucidated, i.e., that the plaintiff, without con;. 
pulsion, voluntarily walked into a known construe. 
tion area, from which she knew traffic had been de-
toured, in complete darkness and into an open exca. 
vation. 
If the right of the plaintiff to recover is showr 
to be non-existent, summary judgment should be 
granted to avoid expending the time, effort, and 
expense that would be involved in holding further 
proceedings. Abdillkadir vs. Western Pacific Ran. 
road C01npany, 7 Utah 2d 53, 318 P.2d 339; Con· 
tinental Bank vs. Cunningham, 10 Utah 2d 329, 353 
P.2d 168. The propriety of exercising the summary 
judgment procedure at pre-trial was affirmed in 
Whitman vs. W. T. Grant Co., 16 Utah 2d 81, 395 
P.2d 918, wherein the plaintiff stated in his depo· 
sition that he stepped into an open elevator shaft 
because he opened what appeared to be an ordinary 
door which he assumed to be an outside exist ana 
stepped sideways, making about a three-quarter 
turn to close the door behind him. On the basis of 
18 
this testimony at his deposition that he was not look-
ing in the direction which he stepped as he went 
through the door, the trial court granted summary 
judgment in favor of the defendant and the judg-
ment ·was afffrmed by this Court on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The uncontroverted facts in this case show that 
the plaintiff deliberately and voluntarily walked 
into a known detoured construction area in darkness 
so complete that it obscured the ground on which she 
vrnlked and substantial objects in the vicinity. She 
was not subjected to threat of immediate or immin-
ent danger which would require her to make a hasty 
or impulsive decision. To the contrary she had ample 
time and opportunity to make a deliberate choice 
regarding he1· subsequent conduct. However, she 
then walked into the construction area where she 
had no right to be and where defendant had no duty 
to anticipate that she would be. The detour signs 
had already warned her of the limits of authorized 
travel around the construction zone. Defendant sub-
mits that reasonable minds could not differ in find-
ing that an ordinarily prudent person would, or in 
the exercise of reasonable care should have known 
that it was imprudent to walk into a known con-
struction area in darkness so complete that the plain-
tiff could not see where she was placing her feet. 
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